Front Page Section Front |
 |
|
Jones Act Fleet Vital To National
Defense |
| Task Force: U.S. Ships, Seafarers Are Important Assets In Military Transportation |
The Jones Act and other cabotage laws reserve domestic maritime markets for vessels owned, built, registered and crewed in the U.S. The Jones Act--Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920--applies to commercial cargoes on all port ranges and between the continental U.S. and remote states and U.S. territories. The JARC has inspired four separate Jones Act repeal bills in the House and Senate. Each bill drew scant support, and each lapsed with little or no official attention. In 1998, the Jones Act Reform Coalition--which represents U.S. and multinational agricultural, energy, chemical, mining, and manufacturing interests, many with ties to foreign-flag merchant vessels--dropped outright Jones Act repeal as its principal demand and proposed instead that the law be amended to permit foreign-built dry bulk carriers and tankers to operate between U.S. ports on the East, West, and Gulf Coasts and on the Great Lakes. The proposal, touted by the coalition alone as a "compromise," was presented as legislation by Kansas Republican Sen. Sam Brownback and Michigan Republican Rep. Nick Smith. Neither measure advanced. Last May, Sen. Brownback reintroduced his bill. There was no House version as of Aug. 1. In the ongoing debate, Jones Act critics routinely contend that the law serves no valid defense purpose, that the Jones Act fleet was not a factor in the Persian Gulf mobilization and war, and that the Jones Act will become even more irrelevant in defense planning. But the Maritime Cabotage Task Force has effectively dashed those arguments in Congressional testimony and public presentations, and its latest work updates prior studies. "Jones Act ships played vital roles during the Persian Gulf conflict, but it is overly simplistic to view the national security importance of the Jones Act solely through the narrow prism of how many Jones Act vessels transported military equipment directly into the Persian Gulf during that conflict," the report said. The report cited "a long-standing tenet of U.S. policy" that U.S. security depends on "its position as a maritime power" and "the strength of its national maritime infrastructure." The Jones Act fleet is the "foundation" supporting both. Ninety-four percent of all U.S.-flag vessels of 1,000 gross registered tons or larger, 76 percent of U.S. shipbuilding "opportunity," 87 percent of all U.S. seagoing jobs, and 97 percent of all U.S. waterborne commerce are accounted for under the Jones Act, the report said. "Without the critical mass represented by the domestic fleet, the U.S. would be unable to sustain the maritime infrastructure essential to its national security." The report noted that the administration had designated domestic transportation as one of eight critical infrastructures necessary for national security and economic vitality. Thus, cabotage laws are critical because they ensure U.S. ownership of and control over domestic marine transportation assets, competitive balance in domestic trades with no government subsidies, and "a stable investment climate for American shipbuilders and ship operators." Any attempt to open domestic markets to foreign interests "must be viewed as a grave threat to U.S. maritime power and to U.S. national security." The Jones Act merchant fleet includes 32 percent of the active commercial roll-on/roll-off, container, and lighter-aboard ships and 81 percent of the tankers the Department of Defense would need access to for sealift service in a prolonged distant war, the task force report said. During the Gulf war, two Jones Act RO/RO ships and six tankers were tapped for military support services overseas. Five of the vessels entered the war zone, while three delivered fuels to U.S. troops outside the zone. Meanwhile, Jones Act vessels in the U.S. delivered cargoes to military terminals, carried raw materials for defense production, and maintained essential domestic trade. Moreover, civilian U.S. merchant marine officers and unlicensed crews that had worked in Jones Act trades were aboard government-owned strategic sealift ships, prepositioned vessels, and U.S. Ready Reserve Force ships that delivered U.S. supplies and unit equipment to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf points. While DOD relies on government-owned ships for surge sealift service in national security emergencies, that policy is feasible only if "the national maritime infrastructure is capable of providing the shipyard facilities necessary to activate those vessels in large numbers on short notice and of providing trained crew members to operate them," the report noted. "The U.S. domestic merchant fleet is essential to both prongs of that policy." The report continued: "While having provided valuable support for U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf conflict and playing a vital role in sustaining the national maritime infrastructure are two ways in which the Jones Act fleet has or is contributing to U.S. national security, it is also important to look at the role it may be expected to play in future conflicts." With 30 percent of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement capacity, 29 percent of the active U.S.-flag container vessel fleet, 50 percent of the RO/RO fleet, and 81 percent of the tanker fleet operating under the Jones Act, that role is certain to become even more significant, particularly in a two-front war--simultaneous crises in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia, for example. | ||||
 | ||||
|
