Study documents value of Ready Reserve Force

Study documents value of Ready Reserve Force

Fleet attained 98.2 percent reliability rate during sealift for Operation Iraqi Freedom

      The civilian-manned U.S. Ready Reserve Force sealift fleet proved its value during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, according to a study released Feb. 6 by the Maritime Administration.
      All reserve ships held in reduced operating status with officers and crews aboard were activated on time, and the fleet operated at an overall "reliability" rate of 98.2 percent, according to the study. "Challenges" that did arise were unrelated to vessel management and operation.
      In all, 36 RRF ships were called up between June 2003 and September 2003--30 roll-on/roll-off ships, three break-bulk freighters, two aviation support ships, and one auxiliary crane ship. These vessels were supplemented by four RRF vessels already pre-positioned overseas.
      American Maritime Officers represented the licensed personnel on 16 of the activated ships and on the four pre-positioned vessels. AMO represents the engine, deck and radio-electronics officers on 39 of the total 72 ships in the reserve fleet, which is managed for MARAD by U.S.-flag ship operators. Once underway, the ships are controlled by the Navy's Military Sealift Command.
      During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the RRF ships carried 30 million square feet of defense cargo to the Persian Gulf war zone--enough to fill 62 football fields. The RRF's share totaled 23 percent of the volume "moved to theater by sealift." The cargoes were used by the U.S. Army's 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Assault Divisions, V Corps, and the U.S. Marine Corps 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Forces.
      The ships carried a total of 1,207 contract civilian mariners, all members of AMO, the Seafarers International Union, and other seagoing unions. The ships also carried 12-man "Force Protection Teams" from the Army and National Guard.
      Officers and crews aboard the ships were inoculated against anthrax and smallpox and equipped with small arms.
      Citing "lessons learned" from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, the report said there had been "significant improvements" in RRF "maintenance management, activation efficiency, ship reliability and logistics management" in the last 10 years.
      These improvements were attributed in large part to additional peacetime RRF exercises and the practice of keeping officers and crews on front-line reserve ships. Before Desert Shield and Desert Storm, RRF ships often languished at layup berths, and officers and crews were not assigned to them until the vessels were needed.
      "While each of MARAD's post-Desert Shield/Storm initiatives contributed to the sustained effectiveness of the ship management programs, the Reduced Operational Status (ROS) program has become the cornerstone of RRF readiness," the study report said. "The return on investment in the ROS program has been demonstrated not only by a consistent history of on-time activations, but also in the preservation of a mariner workforce with critical ship maintenance skills in an era of declining industrial base support."
      The report added: "While the RRF's performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom has been noteworthy in terms of activation readiness and ship reliability, a number of additional mission-related challenges--not related to ship material readiness--arose during the activation, loadout and mission operation of the ships. Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom indicate that future operations will require increased operational readiness in areas including communications security, command and control, chemical, biological and radiological defense (CBRD) preparedness, counter-terrorism proficiency, bioterrorism inoculations, and enhanced shipboard force protection."
      The report said evolving RRF "mission requirements" since the terrorist attacks in the U.S. in September 2001 "place increased levels of responsibility on all crewmembers, ship managers and the ship operations management team for ensuring mission accomplishment in operational environments characterized by increased risks of terrorist attack and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction."
      The report also warned that RRF maintenance budgets could be strained as the fleet ages. By 2011, 17 RRF ships will have reached or exceeded the 50-year mark, while the remaining 45 vessels will have an average age of 37 years. Once a ship hits 50, "obsolescence clearly takes its toll, and readiness/reliability have accumulated significant risk," the report said.
      The study report recommended that MARAD, MSC and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (formerly Military Traffic Management Command) "activate and employ RRF ships for routine and special exercises to the greatest extent possible." Active service provides the most effective way to identify structural and mechanical deficiencies, while prolonged layup can delay activation and diminish "mission readiness."
      The report also recommended that MARAD "leverage the demonstrated effectiveness of assigning, to selected ships, a team of crew members who have a level of familiarity with hands-on experience with the ship, and who have been trained in CBR-D, anti-terrorism, and other mission-essential areas." Officer and crew assignments should reflect "the material readiness requirements of the aging fleet" and "the declining state of industrial base support."
      MARAD should also survey each RRF ship to determine what it needs for CBR-D washdown and decontamination, ensure that adequate quantities and sizes of personal protective gear are available to support civilian mariner crews during surge operations, and "coordinate" with labor unions to improve understanding and administration of inoculations and to compile an accurate immunization data base, the report said.
      In addition, MARAD and MSC should develop guidelines for armed security forces aboard reserve ships, and MARAD should "incorporate crew readiness measures into no-notice ('turbo') activations and deployment readiness exercises by including performance measurements of crew-related mission readiness standards in areas such as secure communications proficiency, small arms qualifications, CBR-D readiness, anti-terrorism competence and fulfillment of vaccination requirements."
      The report further recommended that MARAD "obtain Defense Messaging System" capability to "ensure effective message traffic receipt at MARAD headquarters," work with SDDC and other defense agencies to improve cargo configuration, combine no-notice RRF activation and maintenance exercises with cargo handling demonstrations, team with MSC to develop alternative "point-to-point ship replenishment procedures" for use when "operational situations or mission-driven contingency requirements" preclude routine logistics.
      MARAD should also develop "a strategy to address recapitalization of the RRF to reconstitute the fleet and to meet evolving Department of Defense requirements." The report emphasized the need to fund the reserve fleet in line with "requirements emerging from current mobility capability studies, and to ensure that the RRF continues to provide responsive and reliable sealift support for future operations."

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