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| By MICHAEL R. McKAY | |
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During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf region in 1990 and 1991, there were several documented cases in which foreign nationals working on U.S. government-chartered foreign-flagged merchant ships refused to deliver U.S. defense cargoes to the war zone. The impact on the U.S.-led Allied effort to force Iraqi troops from occupied Kuwait was minimal, but it could have been disastrous--especially in a longer or wider war.
These incidents validated what the U.S. maritime community and its Congressional supporters had argued for many years: in defense emergencies and matters of U.S. national security, only U.S. citizen merchant mariners can be relied upon absolutely--without question and without hesitation-- for sealift and other military support services, no matter what the mission, no matter what the risk. In the mid-to-late 1990s, this plain, important truth helped U.S. maritime interests overcome Rob Quartel and powerful U.S. and multinational agricultural, energy and chemical interests hell-bent on sinking the Jones Act, which holds domestic deep-sea, Great Lakes and inland waters cargoes for merchant vessels owned, built, flagged and manned in the United States. It also helped solidify bipartisan Congressional support for the Maritime Security Act of 1996, which authorized the Maritime Security Program and kept scores of cargo ships in U.S. registry. In every debate on every maritime policy issue--including U.S.-flag cargo preference on government-financed imports and exports and the potential impact of regional and multilateral service trade negotiations on the U.S. merchant fleet--success for our side has resulted in significant part from the common understanding that the U.S. can always count on its civilian seagoing labor force when national security is at stake. But this central point in the case for a big, busy and diverse U.S. merchant fleet in all trades--foreign and domestic, commercial and military--could prove less persuasive in the next debate because of Marine Engineers Beneficial Association President Ron Davis, who has promised a MEBA boycott of all U.S.-flagged cargo ships chartered for defense purposes by the Navy's Military Sealift Command if these ships are not manned by MEBA members. Davis's no-work commitment to MSC--reinforced in writing by some 200 MEBA members--was made last September, after the defense shipping agency awarded charters to two companies for the operation and maintenance of a total of 11 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships currently operated under MEBA contract by Patriot Contract Services. Under the charters, two of the ships are to be operated for MSC by 3PSC LLC, and nine are to be operated by American Overseas Marine Corp., or AMSEA. 3PSC and AMSEA have collective bargaining agreements with American Maritime Officers. Davis's threat was made publicly and proudly, in MEBA's on-line weekly Telex Times and, most recently, in the September-November 2004 issue of Marine Officer, the union's quarterly magazine. "MEBA has presented over 200 letters to MSC, (U.S. Transportation Command) and U.S. Navy from members stating that they will not sail aboard any of the LMSRs if they are operated by a non-MEBA contracted company," said the unsigned article. "MEBA explained that MEBA members are loyal to their union and that the members' pension and medical benefits are not transferable." Intentionally or not, these statements overlooked the agreement among AMO, MEBA and the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots. Among other things, the tripartite agreement provides for cross-shipping--if either of the three unions cannot fill all of its vessel jobs under a specific government charter, it can turn to the other unions for temporary qualified manpower, with all employer contributions for benefits on behalf of the stand-in officers "passing through" to the pension, medical, vacation and training funds of the appropriate union filling the vacancy or vacancies. The statements in Marine Journal also ignored an earlier commitment to MSC by AMO, MEBA and the MMP, which pledged never to let an MSC-chartered vessel be delayed by a shortage of officers. More importantly, these MEBA statements provide critics of the U.S. merchant fleet with their first real opening against our principal, once-impenetrable political defense. The Davis strategy could bring lasting harm upon the men and women of the American merchant marine on at least two imminent fronts: Ironically, the NSPS proposal--unveiled last February but put on hold during the Presidential election--was authorized in the same legislation that provided for renewal and expansion of the Maritime Security Program through 2015. I do not know if Ron Davis really expects MEBA members to boycott the LMSRs and other MSC-chartered ships in real emergencies, but I believe that, if push came to shove and the lives of American armed forces were at risk, the MEBA rank and file would defy the MEBA leadership and "turn to" wherever needed. I also know that AMO is fully prepared not only to meet its manpower obligations under the LMSR charters, but to keep faith with the provisions of the AMO-MEBA-MMP accord, which promotes national security while serving the interests of the three unions' memberships. |
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